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Abstract: This article outlines a republican perspective on disability. We argue that a 
commitment to ensuring the republican freedom of disabled citizens offers a promising 
account of what disabled citizens are owed as a matter of justice. A republican 
perspective offers a particular diagnosis of the injustice of disability disadvantage, both 
in relation to individuals (dominium) and the state (imperium), that is congenial to 
prominent concerns voiced by the disability rights movement. This article also offers a 
brief outline of three republican remedies: the right of social participation, the right of 
opportunities for civic contribution and the right of democratic contestation. These 
remedies constitute key guidelines for the robust institutional protection of disabled 
citizens' republican freedom. 
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Introduction 
 
There is little disagreement that disabled people face considerable disadvantages across 
many social dimensions, affecting their wellbeing and opportunities to live a decent, 
meaningful and dignified life (Brownlee and Cureton, 2009). In most contemporary 
advanced societies, disabled persons are effectively excluded from social and political 
life, which many believe reflects a particularly nasty form of social injustice. It may 
come as a surprise that, until recently, philosophical accounts of social justice have 
systematically ignored concerns of disability and the equal treatment of disabled 
persons. Lawrence Becker argues that this long neglect is ‘partly due to the fact that 
until the last half of the twentieth century, the number of severely disabled people who 
had any reasonable hope of long-term survival was small, and until recent medical 
advances, the medical treatment and social arrangements that could help them were 
limited and relatively cheap’ (Becker, 2005: 9). 
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 Adding insult to injury, to the extent that disability is considered, the leading 
approaches in contemporary political philosophy appear to lock disabled persons into a 
permanent marginalised social status by building their respective theories of social 
justice on a foundation in which ‘normal’ bodily, cognitive or emotional functioning is 
taken for granted. In this political philosophers often follow the lead of John Rawls, 
who in A Theory of Justice (1999) and subsequent work explicitly side-steps 
considerations of disability. 
 
I have assumed throughout and shall continue to assume, that while citizens 
do not have equal capacities, they do have, at least to the essential minimum 
degree, the moral, intellectual, and physical capacities that enable them to 
be fully cooperating members of society over a complete life. (Rawls, 1996: 
183) 
 
The problem is not restricted to Rawlsian contractualism, however. Competing 
philosophical approaches ranging from libertarianism to utilitarianism share a similar 
outlook. The consequences for a disabled individual’s status as a moral person can be 
dire. David Gauthier’s (1986) mutual advantage contractarianism, for instance, holds 
that since any solution to competing claims on social resources would require taking 
into account the bargaining position of the respective stakeholders, the disabled have no 
claims of justice on us because they allegedly bring nothing of value to the negotiation 
table. Gauthier’s is an extreme position that most political philosophers are keen to 
avoid. Nevertheless, while in other approaches the disadvantage suffered by disabled 
persons merits some moral consideration, disability disadvantage typically falls short of 
constituting a central problem of social justice. In contemporary political philosophy, 
disability remains an outlier problem (Silvers & Pickering Francis, 2005). 
 
Disability and Theories of Social Justice: Two Challenges 
 
In recent years a number of philosophers have started to take disability more seriously 
in an attempt to move disability concerns to the core of a philosophical theory of social 
justice (e.g., Silvers, Wasserman and Mahowald, 1998; Nussbaum, 2006; Brownlee and 
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Cureton, 2009; Kittay and Carlson, 2010). The capability approach, pioneered by 
Amartya Sen (1992; 1999a; 1999b) and further developed in the context of disability by 
Martha Nussbaum (2006, 2009), in particular has made important inroads in 
constructing a theory of social justice that takes disability seriously (see also Burchardt, 
2004). However, not everyone agrees capability theory succeeds in granting disabled 
citizens full equal status (Silvers and Stein, 2008; Stark, 2009). 
 A successful theory of justice for disabled persons needs to meet two key 
challenges. First, a theory of justice must ensure that disabled persons obtain the 
necessary material and social support to enable them to lead a decent and dignified life. 
But it must do this while simultaneously ensuring receipt of such support does not 
violate their equal social status. A theory that either fails to grant disabled persons a 
level of support sufficient for them to lead a minimally flourishing life, or grants such 
support on conditions that infringe on their human dignity – for instance, by having to 
shamefully reveal themselves as ‘dependent’ or ‘in special need’ compared to the non-
disabled majority (Anderson, 1999; Wolff, 1998) – is unsatisfactory. 
 A second challenge is foundational. A plausible theory of social justice must 
ensure that the fate of disabled citizens remains at the centre of its account. Disability 
concerns should be not relegated to a ‘mere extension’ of the core theory, to be 
addressed with a special set of arguments after having sorted out issues common to the 
non-disabled majority. In other words, a satisfactory theory of justice must incorporate 
the particular interests of disabled persons in a way that puts them on an equal 
philosophical footing with non-disabled persons. The principles governing relations of 
social justice should affect disabled and non-disabled citizens alike, and the moral 
foundations of those principles must remain indifferent between various forms of ability 
or disability. 
 In this article we propose that the republican political philosophy offers a third 
alternative in which considerations of disabled people’s interests are given critical 
attention in a manner that does not depend on them having a distinctive status from the 
non-disabled majority. Republicanism offers an account of what it means to be a free 
political agent – a citizen – in a modern society, and what obligations the polity incurs 
for safeguarding political agency. Historically, the republican theory of political 
freedom as the basis of a just social order originates in the work of political thinkers as 
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diverse as Aristotle and Cicero, Machiavelli, Marsilius of Padua or James Harrington, 
and should not be confused with the US Republican Party or Sinn Féin in Ireland. In 
recent years, political philosophers such as Philip Pettit (1997, 2001) and Quentin 
Skinner (1998) have recast republicanism as a third form of freedom, distinct from both 
the negative freedom (‘freedom from interference’) associated with classical liberalism 
and the positive freedom (‘freedom as self-mastery’) against which Isaiah Berlin riled in 
his famous lecture Two Concepts of Liberty (Berlin, 1969). Having thus put what 
Benjamin Constant (1989) terms the ‘liberty of the ancients’ on a strong philosophical 
footing, contemporary republican theorists are establishing a social order in which 
citizens can live lives of their own - free from the arbitrary interference of others. 
 A republican perspective on disability effectively reconstitutes the problem of 
‘disability disadvantage’ as being centrally concerned with agency, freedom and 
political participation (i.e., citizenship) of disabled people. This, republicans maintain, 
is a key interest disabled citizens emphatically share with their non-disabled fellow 
citizens. In this, republicanism offers a perspective that has clear affinities with the 
leading concern of disability rights activists, namely that the disabled are excluded from 
social and political decisions that affect their ability to live a life of their own (Charlton, 
1998; Oliver, 1990). Unfortunately, like the mainstream political theories mentioned 
above, republicans have so far failed to consider the implications of their approach for 
the field of disability and disability policy. The work on this has to start in earnest, and 
this article is a first attempt to address this lacuna. 
 
The Idea of Republican Freedom 
 
Republicanism is a political theory with at its core a specific notion of freedom, 
freedom as non-domination. A just society, according to republican political theory, is a 
society that robustly safeguards the freedom-from-domination of all its citizens, which 
implies the ability to put one’s life plans into practice without having to suffer the 
arbitrary interference from another individual or group (Pettit, 1997; Lovett, 2010). 
Republican freedom can be best understood as encompassing three key dimensions. 
 First, republican freedom is a distinct form of social freedom. It focuses on the 
intervention of another agent into our plans, not merely on expanding the set of options 
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or capabilities of a person to do what she might want to do (Van Parijs, 1995). 
Republicans value an individual having more options available to chose from rather 
than less, but to suffer from unfreedom it must be the case that some options are closed 
off because of the (possible) intervention of a third party, whether this is an individual, a 
group or an institutional agent such as the state (Pettit, 1997; 2001). Not having the 
option to do x is unfortunate in many ways, but being restricted in doing x because of 
the potential intervention of another is wrong. Republicanism is primarily geared at 
addressing this wrong. The focus on social (un)freedom easily applies to disability: as 
we know from the literature on the social model of disability, what turns an impairment 
into a disability is in many cases the social structure in which an impairment is 
embedded (Oliver, 1988; 1990). It is not just the absence of functioning legs, but also 
the presence of stairs or narrow corridors making it difficult to manoeuvre a wheelchair 
that restrict a paraplegic person’s mobility. Since the social structure is a direct 
consequence of human agency (or of the purposeful lack of agency), the republican 
perspective on social freedom covers the full range of disability considerations. 
 Second, a crucial aspect of the republican notion of freedom-as-nondomination 
is that the mere possibility of interference is sufficient to render someone unfree in the 
republican sense (Pettit, 1997). Republicans distinguish themselves from classical 
liberals favouring ‘freedom-as-noninterference’ by arguing that you can be made unfree 
simply because someone has the ability to intervene, quite independent of whether this 
person actually intervenes. A person who is free to chose x over y simply because a 
powerful person (capable of intervening) approves of this choice is not really free, for if 
she would have opted for y she would have been prevented from doing so. More 
troubling even, in many cases an individual’s freedom depends on currying the favours 
of a powerful person, which effectively gives someone else a say over how I chose to 
comport myself towards her. For republicans domination often manifests itself is 
through the social mechanism of deference. Here the application to disability is 
straightforward, for disabled individuals often have to adjust their perspective to what 
others believe they can do, or should do, or even should want. 
 The cultural domination entailed by the spectre of ‘normal expectations’ is 
perhaps one of the most devious instruments for the non-disabled majority to exercise 
domination over the lives of disabled citizens (McRuer, 2006). Normal expectations 
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drive non-disabled persons' evaluation of the level of functioning that a disabled person 
is supposed to be capable of in (or not capable of) in as diverse areas of social 
participation such as living independently, engaging in social and sexual relations, 
getting involved in politics, moving around town, obtaining an education, working in a 
regular job, and so on (Silvers, 1998). Normal expectations also ground an attitude of 
pity and charity as opposed to one of rights and justice towards the needs of disabled 
people (Barton, 1999). In most cases, this attitude results in the literal exclusion of 
disabled individuals in key areas of social life. 
 Third, for republicans domination occurs when an individual suffers arbitrary 
interference, not just any type of interference. Roughly we can define arbitrary 
interference as that interference in which another agent is able to shape my choices 
without regard for my own interests; that is, when there is no requirement for 
interference to track what Pettit (2001) calls the ‘avowable interests’ of a person. For 
republicans, interference that reasonably tracks a person's avowable interests cannot be 
said to impede freedom in the relevant sense. More still, for republicans interference is 
regularly justified precisely to protect freedom-as-nondomination, in which case it is 
itself not dominating. This third feature is perhaps the most controversial aspect of the 
republican conception of freedom, for it remains unclear how precisely to determine 
when we have appropriately taken account of other people’s interests (Lovett, 2010). 
When it comes to the interests of disabled individuals we should certainly move with 
extreme caution when trying to determine what is in their best interests. It is important, 
however, to keep in mind republicans are appropriately wary of any form of overt or 
hidden paternalism: they are adamant that each person is given a genuine opportunity to 
assert their own perspective and contest the views of others in this regard. We return to 
this point below. 
Phillip Pettit, the leading republican political theorist, summarises the core of the 
republican ideal as follows: an individual enjoys freedom-as-nondomination when she 
is capable of making choices from a social position that protects her from potential alien 
control (Pettit, 2001). 
 
Enjoying social freedom (having a status that guards you against arbitrary 
interference) means being proof or at least being relatively proof against 
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[arbitrary] interference. No matter what your preferences are, and no matter 
what the feelings of others happen to be, your social standing will still serve 
you well. It will provide a protective field that makes you resistant to the 
arbitrary incursions of others. It will ensure that, intuitively, you are in 
control of what you choose. (Pettit, 2006: 136) 
 
A free person is a citizen in the fullest sense of the term: a person who is free by virtue 
of being an equal and equally protected member of a polity shared with others who 
occupy a similar position. 
 
Republican Freedom and Disability: Dominium and Imperium 
 
Institutionally, republicanism calls for robust protection against the power of 
individuals or groups to interfere in our lives without due regard for our avowable 
interests. Failure to do so constitutes domination, expressed in two main forms: 
dominium and imperium (Pettit, 2001: 152ff). 
 Dominium refers to situations where certain individuals or groups retain the 
systematic ability, often mediated in complicated ways through social structures and 
state institutions, to arbitrarily interfere with the lives and plans of others. We only have 
to think about the many ways in which disabled citizens are socially discriminated 
against through a combination of norms, expectations, cultural frameworks and 
established rules or conventions to appreciate the widespread existence of dominium in 
the lives of disabled citizens. 
 One of the most important ways in which dominium manifests itself is by 
regulating (access to) the workplace. To date, despite considerably legislative effort, 
employment participation by disabled workers lags behind those of their non-disabled 
colleagues in both times of economic growth and recession (Stein, 2000; Barnes and 
Mercer, 2005). Disabled people still face considerable structural problems entering the 
labour market (Barnes, 2000; Russell, 2002). All too often, ‘the types of jobs offered to 
disabled people are low status, low waged occupations with poor working conditions 
and few opportunities for advancement’ (Barnes, 2000: 450). Even where decent jobs 
are on offer, disabled workers continuously face the problem of normal expectations 
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and the implied assumption that, even with reasonable accommodations, disabled 
workers are less productive. Employers and those representing business interests 
typically fail to appreciate that relatively few disabled people require major 
accommodations; that many of the accommodations that disabled people do require are 
not costly in themselves; or that accommodations often benefit the workplace more 
generally through spillover effects and are thus ‘rational’ in a strict economic sense 
(Stein, 2000). 
 Pettit (1997) argues that combating domination requires significant state action, 
but this in turn introduces the substantial risk that the state and its subordinate 
institutions and policies themselves become agents of domination by failing to take into 
account the avowable interests of disabled citizens. Such domination originated in the 
state is called imperium, and unfortunately the problem is rife when it comes to 
disability. The arbitrary interference of state bureaucrats of all sorts in the lives of 
disabled people has taken on pandemic proportions, often producing unacceptable forms 
of exclusion. It is symptomatic that disabled citizens are systematically 
underrepresented in political institutions, which not only implies a failure of the 
democratic state to attend to a requirement of democratic presence (Phillips, 1995) but 
has profound effects on disabled citizens' power to shape the policy agenda (Witcher, 
2005). 
 Imperium also features prominently in the legal system, even in those parts of 
the law specifically designed to protect disabled persons. According to some critics, one 
of the most significant pieces of legal protection of disability rights, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), has failed to deliver on its promise since for disabled people to 
enjoy protection under the law they must first establish that the law applies to them 
(Pickering Francis and Silvers, 2000). There exist numerous cases where disabled 
people failed to obtain proper protection in large part because the legal categories were 
construed in a narrow sense, and consequently many disabilities were left outside the 
scope of the law (Kelman, 2000). The ADA experience demonstrates the extent to 
which well-intentioned political legislation may be thwarted by the perspectives and 
actions of another powerful branch of the state, the courts and associated legal 
institutions. 
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The experience of domination suffered by disabled citizens, as recorded by 
disability rights activists and disability studies scholars (Charlton, 1998; Oliver, 1988, 
1990; Silvers, Wasserman and Mahowald, 1998), corresponds well to the two modes of 
domination - dominium and imperium - proposed by Pettit. Employing the criterion of 
freedom-as-nondomination as a diagnostic tool, republicans hold that disabled people 
have a core interest in living their lives in accordance with their own values, interests 
and reasons, protected from the arbitrary interference from other individuals as well as 
the state. Disabled people will naturally want to live their lives to the fullest of their 
capacities, which requires real opportunities to participate in the polity in a form and to 
the extent they themselves choose. In all of these things disabled people are assumed to 
be no different from non-disabled persons: all citizens, disabled or not, equally aspire to 
be maximally free agents and citizens. This shared foundation of moral, social and 
political equality – one we believe is affirmed by the bulk of disability activism and 
scholarship – is what underlies the republican diagnosis of disability disadvantage. 
 
Republican Rights as Remedies 
 
A republican theory of freedom diagnoses disabled individuals as being under threat of 
domination by the non-disabled majority and by the state. Countering such domination 
in the personal and public sphere in turn requires a robust set of institutional remedies. 
This section sketches in outline three broad types of rights that follow quite naturally 
from adopting a republican perspective on disability. 
 
A Right to Social Participation 
 
A republican perspective insists that disabled citizens are granted robust access to the 
public sphere, and are in no way marginalised or rendered invisible as was historically 
often the case. Such a republican requirement of participation supports strong anti-
discrimination legislation as well as positive accommodation measures that enable 
disabled persons to participate in the social and political life of a modern citizen. As 
such this appears to offer little new. However, in our view a republican perspective 
amounts to a novel and robust vindication of such legislation by reconstituting the 
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interests and concerns of disabled persons as those of dominated citizens, a genuine 
moral affront in a republican society. 
 Discrimination on grounds of disability in any social sphere – be it employment, 
education, health, sexuality or, indeed, politics itself – is an obvious source of 
domination, and therefore must be outlawed on republican grounds. The discriminated 
citizen suffers an uncontroversial instance of arbitrary interference whenever she fails to 
obtain a goal in life merely by being singled out because of her impairment. For 
republicans what is socially harmful is not differential treatment as such, but the 
increased vulnerability to arbitrary interference or domination that inevitably 
accompanies discrimination. Negative discrimination on the basis of a physical, 
cognitive or emotional impairment clearly renders a person vulnerable to domination by 
others (and the state). On the other hand, positive discrimination of those requiring 
special accommodation to enable them to participate on equal terms with other citizens 
has no such negative effect: differential treatment here is not merely permissible, it is 
required. 
 This means that a republican right of participation in principle sanctions 
extensive measures of accommodation, no matter how costly to society at large, to 
safeguard the republican freedom of all its citizens (disabled and non-disabled alike). In 
practice the precise form and scope of accommodation will require balancing a number 
of practical policy concerns, such as negotiating competing claims from distinct 
vulnerable groups  (including different disability groups with their own specific 
demands). Disagreement about the particulars of disability accommodation does not 
imply that we fail to respect the republican requirement of participation; it merely 
reflects the fact that implementing a general goal can be achieved through different 
practical measures, and reasonable disagreement about those at the level of detailed 
policy proposals is the hallmark of a vibrant polity. 
 The goal of participation nevertheless sets robust principled boundaries on the 
scope and form of substantive disagreement about reasonable accommodation. For 
instance, when the value of a particular option is negatively affected by its policy format 
(say, by requiring the recipient to submit to intrusive acts of ‘shameful revelation’ in 
order to obtain a particular form of assistance), this inherently affects a disabled 
citizens' avowable interests. Republicans therefore must pay close attention to the 
 11 
precise manner in which a policy is instituted, and not merely to the formal options it 
delivers. Similarly, a form of accommodation that is less secure because its successful 
implementation depends on the discretion of external agents (e.g., social workers) may 
rightly be challenged by disabled citizens on republican grounds. After all, for 
republicans the mere possibility of interference is sufficient to threaten republican 
freedom. What this means in practice is that republican political theory significantly 
favours policy options that offer disabled citizens as much individual control as 
possible. 
 It follows that republicans question the continued existence of quasi-
institutionalisation, where disabled citizens continue having to rely on services inside 
institutions for lack of appropriate support within their own homes and communities. 
The disability movement has rightly focused much of its attention in recent years on 
advocating service models that leave the disabled client in charge of the terms under 
which a service is acquired and used. A well-known example is the use of direct 
payments allowing service users themselves to contract service providers for a variety 
of forms of assistance (Carmichael & Brown, 2002; Pearson, 2000; Riddell et al., 2005; 
Hassler, 2004). While this model is not a panacea, the extent of republican control it 
offers disabled clients in a key dimension of their lives is hard to fault. 
 
A Right to Civic Contribution 
 
For republicans a vibrant polity is not merely a framework that ensures that citizens' 
freedom-as-nondomination is respected. There is a strong, albeit controversial, strand 
within republican political thought suggesting that in a republican polity citizens affirm 
a particular conception of the ‘good political life’ (Dagger, 1997; Honohan, 2002). This 
civic strand envisages that citizens engage in active politics not merely to instrumentally 
protect their own republican freedom, but because they assign independent value to the 
political act of jointly constituting the republican society. 
 This perspective bears a close relationship with the work of Anita Silvers (1998; 
Silvers and Pickering Francis, 2005; 2009), who in the past decade has argued that 
social justice for disabled individuals requires granting disabled persons equal 
opportunities to contribute to society. In our modern society, she argues, ‘[t]he 
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dominant institutional infrastructure for productive interaction determines who will and 
who will not be disabled’ because ‘the dominant cooperative scheme sets the demands 
that social participants must satisfy’ (Silvers, 1998: 108). Some philosophers have 
insisted that efficiency considerations – in part driven by the dynamics of the majority-
minority numbers game – offer sufficient reason to accept the terms of the current 
cooperative arrangement, even where these actively serve to deny disabled citizens the 
full capacity to contribute (Buchanan, 1996). Silvers (1998: 109ff) disagrees and 
counters that there is no reason to accept the idea that a dominant cooperative scheme is 
efficient merely because it is dominant. Facile references to ‘efficiency’ commonly 
mask ignorance and special interests on the part of dominant groups, who fail or 
stubbornly refuse to consider alternative ways in which optimising alternatives may be 
instituted. 
 Silvers continues her argument, stating that ‘[t]he state has an interest in 
protecting people with disabilities, one predicated not on their being weak and 
incompetent but rather on their having been arbitrarily, incorrectly, or unfairly excluded 
from contributing their strengths and talents to the community’ (Silvers, 1998: 112). 
This is grist to the republican mill. If civic contribution is held to be a crucial aspect of 
being a citizen, republicans must insist the state ought to seriously address any 
obstruction (or lack of real opportunity) that ‘disables’ citizens in this dimension. 
 There are several good reasons to think that civic contribution is indeed of 
sufficient importance to citizens, disabled and able-bodied alike, to warrant strong 
enabling measures. For starters, to not have the capacity to contribute to the collective 
project of the polity is to be effectively relegated to the status of a second-class citizen. 
The precise form of civic contribution matters less than the fact that whatever 
contribution is made is regarded as a genuine civic contribution – and certainly that 
whatever contribution someone is willing to make is appropriately supported and not 
actively frustrated (Kittay, 2005). 
 In addition, when the nature of the impediment for civic contribution of disabled 
citizens takes the form of structural constraints, this constitutes an ‘intervention’ in the 
strict sense of the term. For republicans such intervention is only justified on terms that 
take appropriate account of the avowable interests of the person interfered with: it is 
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hard to imagine cases of systematically denying disabled citizens opportunities to 
contribute that would fit this criterion. 
 Relatedly, republicans are committed to changing any impediments on disabled 
citizens' ability to contribute that are arbitrary in the republican sense: that is, 
impediments that take little or no note of the reasons why disabled citizens may want to 
contribute to a society in a form that fits their capacities. To put it in simple terms, who 
are we to deny disabled citizens their desire to contribute to society – and their reasons 
for doing so – by regarding these desires (or reasons) as irrational or flawed? If a large 
number of non-disabled citizens, for whatever reason, take pride in being full 
contributing members of society, ignoring similar motivations of the disabled, and 
denying them the same opportunity to act on their respective views of civic 
contribution, constitutes a clear case of republican unfreedom. A republican polity is a 
cooperative arrangement that allows each citizen to express her ‘civicness’ in line with 
her own abilities, and safeguards her capacity to do so. 
 
A Right to Democratic Contestation 
 
When the requirements of participation and civic contribution are robustly enshrined in 
a republican polity, disabled citizens will be reasonably well protected from forms of 
dominium as well as imperium. Many nevertheless would regard this insufficient, 
however, and republicans too insist on a further procedural remedy in the form of a 
right to democratic contestation. 
 The philosophical foundation underlying this idea has been developed in Philip 
Pettit’s republican ideal of a contestatory democracy (Pettit, 1999; 2000; 2012). For 
Pettit democratic decision-making cannot merely rely on electoral systems but also 
requires mechanisms by which citizens can contest decisions taken in between electoral 
rounds. Where electoral systems bind citizens to policies initiated by representative 
candidates, contestatory democracy offers a much more fine-grained system of 
individual citizens (dis)approving collective decisions or actions. 
 This model of contestatory democracy fits well with key concerns of the 
disability rights movement (Charlton, 1998; Oliver, 1990). Contestation mechanisms 
importantly shift the balance of decision-making back to a state where disabled people 
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are not mere recipients of policy, as in the social welfare model, but are instead 
regarded as genuine political partners in policy design and delivery. Democratically 
speaking, being able to challenge decisions is an apt way of making oneself visible (and 
audible), and therefore rightly regarded as amongst the most important political rights. 
In addition, effective contestation ensures that public policy and state action more 
generally remains firmly grounded in the avowable interests of disabled citizens by 
introducing a politics of presence into disability policy and legislation (Phillips, 1995). 
For republicans, securing accommodation and support is not all that matters; of equal 
importance is the symbolic value expressed in how disability accommodation is 
organised, and in particular the extent to which this in turn expresses the values of 
respect and dignity associated with citizenship status. 
 The goal of contestation requires that disabled citizens are given genuine 
political power over a policy agenda that will likely affect their lives in profound ways – 
specifically, the power to challenge or even veto particular policy proposals. This may 
require instituting particular legal remedies, such as a justiciable right to challenge (De 
Wispelaere & Walsh, 2007), whereby disabled citizens are granted access to legal 
mechanisms that enable them to challenge every aspect of the process leading up to a 
particular disability policy, including needs assessment, decisions over resource 
allocation and the organisational structure underlying disability support services, the 
implementation of disability support (notably the quality or timeliness of policy 
implementation). In some cases this may imply disability administrators instituting 
internal review or complaints procedures, but ultimately it is envisaged a robust 
contestation mechanism will only operate effectively when backed by the full power of 
the law (De Wispelaere & Walsh, 2007). 
 Disability scholars have expressed legitimate concern about the accessibility of 
legal remedies for disabled persons, so careful attention must be given to matters of 
practical design. 
 
Taking action to gain redress for a grievance always requires knowledge, 
support, confidence, energy and staying-power. Due process is complex and 
frequently time-consuming. Worthwhile outcomes cannot be guaranteed. 
These issues, problematic enough in any circumstances, are likely to be 
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magnified for many people with impairments. (Clements and Read, 2005: 
23) 
 
It follows that the institution of robust advocacy services for disabled citizens who face 
severe difficulties accessing legal remedies is essential (Clements and Read, 2003). 
Amongst disability rights activists and scholars, there exists understandable scepticism 
about the capacity of legal action to bring about social change (Engel and Munger, 
2003; Roulstone, 2003; Runswick-Cole, 2007), but it is important to keep in mind that a 
justiciable right to challenge is but one of many mechanisms aimed at safeguarding the 
freedom-as-nondomination of disabled citizens. Its success depends crucially on 
operating effectively and efficiently in conjunction with other republican remedies. 
 Nevertheless, republicans firmly believe there are distinct advantages to granting 
citizens a justiciable right to challenge (De Wispelaere & Walsh, 2007). A contestatory 
mechanism, such as the justiciable right to challenge, robustly ‘tracks’ reasons for 
making a policy decision on disability accommodation. The arguments informing this 
decision are in the public domain and can be traced through the various stages of the 
decision process. Such a perspective fits very well with recent work in political 
philosophy that emphasises the crucial importance of publicity and public reason in the 
justification of social practices (Rawls, 1996; Gutmann and Thomson, 1996). A 
justiciable right to challenge ensures relevant reasons for decision-making are open to 
public scrutiny, which will restrict the use of reasons to those that are acceptable to a 
wider constituency. This mechanism counters the sort of technocratic reasoning 
typically carried out by bureaucratic agencies – in many cases behind closed doors. 
 This process is likely to favour freedom-as-nondomination by creating a public 
space for giving (individual) disabled citizens' avowable interests appropriate airing. 
Publicly available reasoning mediates between different perspectives and interests 
regarding reasonable accommodation decisions by insisting that arguments should be 
brought to the fore in an attempt to reach an acceptable compromise, or else a 
democratic way of agreeing-to-disagree. Contestation offers interesting opportunities 
for all parties to engage in an open debate on what type of accommodation a disabled 
person is entitled to, given important and legitimate competing claims on scarce 
resources. The justiciable right to challenge is best regarded as a mechanism that 
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extends deliberation on disability accommodation into policy-making, a view that 
chimes with the Anita Silver's (1998) demand for a democratic theory of disability. 
 The justiciable right to challenge is characterised by a deep commitment to fair 
proceduralism. ‘Fair proceduralism’ sets itself apart from ‘substantive fairness’ in that 
outcomes are held to be fair because the procedure is fair, not because of the intrinsic 
properties of the outcome itself (Rawls, 1996: 421ff). However, to safeguard robust 
republican freedom these procedures must ultimately deliver substantive outcomes. The 
contention of a republican form of fair proceduralism is that deliberation about reasons 
is in itself conducive (albeit not sufficient in all cases) to promoting republican freedom. 
 To those who believe procedural mechanisms are useless in this regard, the 
republican can offer several replies (De Wispelaere & Walsh, 2007). First, the explicit 
recognition of disabled citizens as key participants in the process of deciding on 
appropriate accommodation policies in itself expresses an important republican value. 
Second, republicans can point at various plausible dynamics that will reinforce 
republican freedom under such a system: altering incentives of disability policy 
administrators who will want to avoid being challenged in the courts, the use of legal 
precedents as guidelines for best-practices, information effects due to regular mutual 
engagement of different stakeholders, increased accountability and decreased 
administrative discretion because of the explicit requirement to motivate the reasons 
behind decisions. With respect to the last point, we should not underestimate the 
importance of requiring administrative agencies to offer publicly acceptable reasons for 
making decisions for the promotion of democratic accountability and overall 
responsiveness of policymakers. The persistent failure to offer reasons that are publicly 
acceptable is likely to trigger popular indignation, and anticipating this response offers 
an important administrative (and political) incentive to take the needs and views of 
disabled service users more seriously than hitherto. 
 While contestation can never mechanically produce a single ‘correct’ policy 
outcome – nor should it -, we have good reasons to believe it will likely shift the 
balance in favour of many disabled citizens who are currently systematically excluded 
from having a say in disability policy. Although ultimately a procedural mechanism, 
republican political theory not only attaches important ‘process value’ to institutions 
that directly recognise and promote the equal political status of disabled citizens, but 
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furthermore underwrites the instrumental importance of contestatory mechanisms for 
arriving at a substantively just outcome of; a republican polity in which disabled 
citizens can live their lives free from domination. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Disabled citizens all too often lead restricted lives and they suffer significant 
disadvantages associated with being disabled. This fact has been documented for many 
decades by the disability movement and is further analysed in disability studies. 
Contemporary political philosophy, however, has largely lagged behind in capturing 
this reality. Competing accounts of what we are owed to each other as a matter of social 
justice have failed to include disability concerns in their respective theories. In fact, they 
typically proceed by explicitly assuming the normal bodily, cognitive and emotional 
functioning of the subjects of social justice, pushing disabled persons to the margins. 
This situation requires urgent rectification. While political philosophers have started to 
examine how to put disability at the centre of a theory of social justice, the theories that 
lend themselves straightforwardly to such accommodation are scant and many require 
extensive revision. 
 In this article we suggested that a republican perspective, which gives central 
place to living one’s life free from domination, offers good prospects for taking 
disability seriously. On the one hand, republicanism can ground disabled persons’ 
interests on a similar philosophical foundation as that of the non-disabled majority. For 
republican political theory argues that disability disadvantage constitutes a genuine 
problem of justice understood as a failure to secure disabled persons' freedom-as-
nondomination, a fundamental human interest that disabled and non-disabled citizens 
share alike. On the other hand, republicanism proscribes institutional remedies that fit 
well with the main concerns of disability rights activists and thus pay careful attention 
to the specific ways in which disabled citizens’ republican freedom is threatened. In line 
with important insights gleaned from the disability studies literature, republicans 
appreciate the spectre of domination has many faces, from dominium (by others) to 
imperium (by the state), which in turn requires carefully designing a set of remedies 
aimed at safeguarding disabled citizens are able to live a life of their own. To be sure, 
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the development of a republican political theory that adequately responds to the many 
complex challenges surrounding how citizens experience disability requires a lot of 
work. But in our view republicanism offers the building blocks for constructing a 
suitably ‘cripped’ theory of freedom and justice (McRuer, 2006), and this article aims to 
contribute to the rethinking of the complex relationship between justice and disability 
disadvantage in political philosophy and disability studies alike. 
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